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A CHALLENGE TO HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN
KENTUCKY
[The houses are] two of many run-down rooming houses in
the City of Louisville .... ' [They are in fact examples of
where the bloom has gone from the rose, and they lack the
realistic capability of becoming a "silk purse." The entire
record of the hearing... is completely void of any evidence
of these buildings being historical .... I
[The two houses] "illustrate the extraordinary diversity
yet harmony of urban integration achieved by Old Louisville
architects in its heyday."'3 [They are] "[a]mong the finest
Richardsonian Romanesque revival houses extant in this
country."4
INTRODUCTION
The validity of Louisville's historical preservation ordi-
nance5 was recently challenged in the Kentucky Supreme
Court. The case of City of Louisville v. Woman's Club' arose
when the city attempted to save two houses which the
Woman's Club wanted torn down for a parking lot. Although
the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed the condemnation action
and held the ordinance arbitrary and confiscatory as written,
7
the Kentucky Supreme Court did not rule on the constitution-
ality of the ordinance, stating that this issue was irrelevant to
the condemnation hearing.8 The Court also stated that the trial
judge should not have dismissed the condemnation action.9
Brief for Appellee at 7, City of Louisville v. Woman's Club, No. 76-298 (Ky. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 17, 1976).
Id. at9.
Brief for National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Neighborhood Develop-
ment Corporation, and the Preservation Alliance of Louisville and Jefferson County,
Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 17, City of Louisville v. Woman's Club, No. 76-298 (Ky. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 17, 1976) (quoting from the National Register report on the Old Louisville
Area).
' Id. at 17-18, (quoting from S. THOMAS & W. MORGAN, OLD LOUISVILLE: THE
VicroRIAN ERA 72 (1975)).
5 LouisviLLE, Ky., ORDINANCE 58, Series 1973 (1973).
4 No. 76-298 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 1976).
City of Louisville v. Woman's Club, No. 197724 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Jan. 17, 1976).
City of Louisville v. Woman's Club, No. 76-298, slip op. at 2 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Dec.
17, 1976).
'Id.
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The Court did not rule on Louisville's power of eminent domain
since the issue was not decided in the lower court.'"
Thus the constitutionality of city-enacted historic preser-
vation ordinances has not yet been decided in Kentucky. If
Kentucky courts agree with the decision of the circuit court,
Kentucky cities will have to rewrite laws designed to protect
their historical and cultural heritage. On the other hand, if
they find such ordinances constitutional, they will follow the
trend of state and federal courts across the country upholding
historic preservation laws."
Historic preservation ordinances are a type of zoning law
which focuses on classifying areas or structures according to
their historic significance rather than on the basis of such fac-
tors as function, size, or height. The ordinances were first en-
acted in the United States in the 1930's and have become quite
common in the last 15 years. 2 The impetus behind these laws
is the preservation of the country's heritage, especially in cities
where numerous older buildings are being razed for newer,
larger structures. 3 Legal procedures other than zoning may
also be utilized to achieve historical preservation.
In order to encourage individuals and organizations to re-
store structures, various levels of government have passed
laws regulating historically significant building and neighbor-
hoods. Some local and state laws directly limit what owners
may do with their property by restrictions on changes to the
exteriors of buildings, or through tax relief. Federal law, by
classifying property as historically significant, provides funds
for restoration.' 4 Increased tourism'- and improved living con-
10 Id. at 3.
" See notes 88-130 infra and accompanying text for an analysis of the decisions
upholding these laws.
,2 See text accompanying notes 29-31 infra for a brief history of these ordinances.
, Note, Use of Zoning Restrictions to Restrain Property Owners from Altering or
Destroying Historic Landmarks, 1975 Dura L.J. 999. "Over half of the 12,000 buildings
listed in the Historic Building Survey undertaken by the federal government in 1933
had been razed by 1970." Id. at 999 n.1.
" See notes 38-50 infra and accompanying text for an explanation of methods of
historic preservation other than zoning ordinances.
,1 It is questioned by some whether this is a beneficial result; by bringing tourists
and businesses to the restored area, the effect is often the opposite of what was origi-
nally envisioned.
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ditions may also have an indirect function in encouraging res-
toration.
This comment focuses on various questions raised by the
Woman's Club case concerning the use of zoning ordinances to
effect historical preservation. As a means of addressing the
constitutional issues involved in this type of historical preser-
vation law, this comment examines the rationale given by the
Jefferson Circuit Court as an example of judicial reasoning on
the subject. This decision can be compared with cases dealing
with the constitutionality of similar ordinances in other juris-
dictions."6
I. HISTORIC PRESERVATION AS ZONING
Zoning as a valid exercise of police power was first upheld
in 1926 in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 7 Since
Euclid, zoning ordinances have been held constitutional as
long as they are reasonably related to legitimate public inter-,
ests.' 8 Generally there is a presumption of validity for these
legislative enactments, 9 and such regulations will stand unless
they are patently arbitrary or unreasonable. However, what is
considered appropriate for legislative regulation may depend
on prevailing economic and social conditions."
Zoning ordinances have been justified as measures related
"An important book on historic preservation is J.H. MORRISON, HisTomC PREsER-
VATION LAW (2d ed. 1965). Symposia include: Historic Preservation Symposium, 12
WAKE FOREST L. Rav. (1976), and Symposium-Perspectives on Historic Preservation,
8 CONN. L. Rv. (1975-76). A bibliography of articles on preservation law is found at
12 WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 175 (1976). Some recent articles on the subject include:
Schroder, The Preservation of Historical Areas, 62 Ky. L.J. 940 (1974); Wilson &
Winkler, The Response of State Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAw & CON-
TEMp. PROB. 329 (1971); Note, supra note 13, Note, Land Use Controls in Historic
Areas, 44 NOTRE DAM E LAw. 379 (1969); and Comment, Legal Methods of Historic
Preservation, 19 BureALO L. REv. 611 (1970).
" 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
" Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928). See Schroder, supra note 16.
G, Ooldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051
(5th Cir. 1975).
25 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). "[W]hile the
meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of their application must
expand or contract to meet new and different conditions which are constantly coming
within the field of their operation." Id. at 387.
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to "public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."' 2' As such,
the regulations fall within the state's police power. In Ken-
tucky, zoning ordinances have been upheld by the courts since
192822 as long as they are reasonably related to the purposes of
the police power.
2 3
Recently, the question has arisen whether zoning ordi-
nances can be upheld on the basis of aesthetics. Originally this
justification was rejected as arbitrary and a matter of individ-
ual taste rather than public need.24 Other cases justified aes-
thetic considerations as legitimate interests by relating them to
economic ones; by applying some aesthetic standard to a regu-
lated area, property values will be maintained or tourism will
be increased, and the public welfare of the community will be
benefited. 5 With Berman v. Parker,2" aesthetic considerations
have come to be included as an aspect of public welfare.
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive
... . The values it represents are spiritual as well as physi-
cal, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of
the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-
balanced as well as carefully patrolled."
22 Id. at 395.
2 Fowler v. Obier, 7 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1928).
2 Under the police power, the Kentucky Court of Appeals (predecessor court to
the Kentucky Supreme Court) has also upheld the "Junk Yard Act" (Ky. REv. STAT.
§§ 177.905-.950 (1971)[hereinafter cited as KRS]) in Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375
S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964) and the "Billboard Act" (KRS §§ 177.830-.890 (1971)) in Moore
v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964). In Jasper the Court stated that the police power
is "as broad and comprehensive as the demands of society make necessary" and "must
keep pace with the changing concepts of public welfare." 375 S.W.2d at 711.
24 Schroder, supra note 16, at 947.
See City of New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So. 2d 798 (La. 1953), upholding the Vieux
Carr6 Ordinance.
See also State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970). An
ordinance of Ladue, a suburb of St. Louis, provided that the Architectural Board had
the authority to approve plans for proposed structures to conform with certain archi-
tectural standards, including aesthetic ones. The court said that while aesthetic con-
siderations alone were not determinative in upholding the ordinance, the ordinance's
effect on property values in the community was important.
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
21 Id. at 33. See also People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
In Kentucky, aesthetic considerations are sufficient to justify the exercise of police
power. Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Ky. 1964); Moore v. Ward, 377
S.W.2d 881, 887 (Ky. 1964).
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The same justifications given for upholding zoning for aesthetic
reasons can be applied to historic preservation zoning, includ-
ing pragmatic economic considerations such as increases in
tourism or property values. 8
The first historic preservation ordinance in the United
States was passed in 1931, in Charleston, South Carolina.
2
1
Since then, such ordinances have been passed in more than 450
communities, 3 including six in Kentucky.3' Various communi-
ties which have passed historic preservation ordinances have
done so by adding provisions to local codes32 or by submitting
the proposed ordinances to the voters for approval.3 3 In any
case, the local ordinances have been adopted pursuant to ena-
bling legislation passed at the state level. 4
Authorization for Kentucky municipalities, including
Louisville, to enact historic preservation ordinances as zoning
comes from the Kentucky legislature. 5 Originally historic pres-
ervation zoning was based on the general state police power.
Since 1966, however, authorization for zoning by cities and
The issue of zoning for aesthetic purposes is a separate inquiry in itself. Some
relevant articles include Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal,
20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955); Steinberg, Hershman, & Michelman, Aesthetics
vs. Free Enterprise-A Symposium, 15 PRAc. LAw. 17 (Feb. 1969); and Comment,
Aesthetic Zoning: Preservation of Historic Areas, 29 FoRDHAm L. REv. 729 (1961).
2 Louisvu.LE, Ky., ORDINANCE 58, Series 1973, § 1 c (1973); Schroder, supra note
16; Comment, supra note 16.
21 Forman, Historic Preservation and Urban Development Law in Louisiana, 21
LA. B.J. 197 (1973).
1 Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 5.
31 Id. The cities are Louisville, Covington, Paducah, Maysville, Lexington, and
Frankfort.
-" See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (App.
Div. 1975).
3 Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 316 A.2d 807, 809 (Md. 1974).
31 Id. The Maryland Code authorizes cities and counties to establish Historic
District Commissions and sets out the general procedure which is to be followed. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 8.01-8.15 (1970). Several revisions have been made in the 1976
cumulative supplement which do not change the impact of the Historic Areas Zoning
Article.
In Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the other hand, the city's authority to create the
historic district ordinance was derived from the state's general grant of zoning power
to communities. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-28-9 to 11 (1953) (current version at §§ 14-
20-1, 3 (1976)). City of Santa Fe v. Gamble- Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964).
Since 1965 there has also been specific enabling legislation for historic districts, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 14-21-1 to 5 (1976).
KRS § 100.201 (1971).
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counties in Kentucky has specifically included zoning to pro-
tect historical districts.35 Kentucky communities are author-
ized to create a board to advise the zoning administration on
such historic districts.37
I. OTHER METHODS OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION
Other legal procedures for historic preservation include
taxation, easements, federal programs, maintenance, and emi-
nent domain.
A. Taxation
Various types of tax incentives which encourage landown-
ers to restore and preserve historic property have been adopted
in some jurisdictions. These include property tax exemptions,
tax credits, abatements, and reduced assessments.18
B. Easements
Historic preservation may also be accomplished by the use
of easements, particularly scenic easements with respect to the
exterior of structures. 9 These are generally easements in gross
as they benefit not only adjacent landowners but the com-
munity in general. Because these easements must be perpetual
in order to be effective, they generally run with the land and
cannot be assigned. 0 To insure a perpetual easement, the prop-
erty owner may convey the easement to a charitable corpora-
tion or agency of the state. Through this technique, the prop-
erty owner is able to retain ownership of the property and the
state is guaranteed that the property will not be destroyed or
altered.4'
2' KRS § 100.201 (1971); KRS § 100.203(1)(e)(Supp. 1976).
KRS § 100.127(3) (Supp. 1976). "TIhe planning agreement may provide for
the creation of a . '. . board to advise the zoning administrator regarding issuance of
permits in such districts ......
18 Shull, The Use of Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation, 8 CONN. L. REv. 334
(1975-76). See also Schroder, supra note 16, at 953-54.
3' Freeman, The Use of Easements for Historic Preservation, LEGAL TECHNIQUES
IN HISTORmC PRESERVATION 28 (National Trust for Historic Preservation 1971).
1o Id. at 28-29.
41 Id. See also Wilson & Winkler, supra note 16; Comment, supra note 16; Com-
ment, Conservation Restkictions: A Survey, 8 CONN. L. Ray. 383 (1975-76).
[Vol. 65
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C. Federal Programs
On the national level, legislation has been passed for the
preservation and maintenance of significant historic sites. The
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 expanded the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places and provides financial assis-
tance for the preservation of property listed on the Register.42
The National Environmental Policy Act requires federal agen-
cies to prepare impact statements for actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment. 3
D. Maintenance Regulations
Some ordinances, including that of Louisville, require that
the property owner maintain the registered structures to pre-
vent deterioration." While this puts a burden on the landowner
greater than that normally required by city ordinances for
maintenance of buildings,45 the ordinance is not invalid.46
E. Eminent Domain
Another possible procedure for historic preservation is
eminent domain, where the government is directly involved
through the condemnation of property for public uses. This
procedure requires the payment of just compensation to the
property owner.4" Eminent domain powers have been used by
local, state, and federal governments. The first major case in-
volving condemnation of historic property for public use was
United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., 1 in which
42 National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470-470b, 470c-470n
(1970). See Schroder, supra note 16; Shull & Shull, New Inroads for Historic
Preservation, 26 AD. L. Rav. 357, 359 (1974).
11 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). See Shull
& Shull, supra note 42, at 362.
Other federal legislation includes the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan
Development Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470b-1 (1970) and the Department of Transpor-
tation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1659 (1970), cited in Schroder, supra note 16, at 961-62.
" Louisviu., Ky., Onn~iNcE 58, Series 1973, § 10a (1973); NEw YORK, N.Y.,
ADMirsTRSTwT CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-10.0 (1976); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516
F.2d 1051, 1066 n.85 (5th Cir. 1975).
" Comment, supra note 16, at 619.
" Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Ky. CONsr. arts. 13, 242.
" 160 U.S. 668 (1896). The use of property for the inspiration of patriotism in
1977]
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the Supreme Court determined that the federal government
had the authority to condemn property for the preservation of
the Gettysburg battlefield area. In Roe v. Kansas ex rel.
Smith,49 the Supreme Court held that Kansas had the author-
ity to condemn the historic site of Shawnee Mission, the estab-
lishment of historical sites being a public use.
In Kentucky the issue of public use in an eminent domain
action recently arose with respect to the Mary Todd Lincoln
House in Lexington. The state's condemnation was upheld;
even though the property is managed by a private organization,
the state owns the historic site." The issue of eminent domain
is now the primary issue before the Jefferson Circuit Court in
the Louisville condemnation action.
III. LOUISVILLE'S HISTORIC PRESERVATION ORDINANCE
Louisville's historic preservation ordinance was passed in
1973 as a means of saving and maintaining the city's historical
and cultural heritage51 for various economic, educational, and
aesthetic reasons.
52
The ordinance provides for the establishment of the Louis-
ville Historic Landmarks and Preservation Districts Commis-
sion,5 3 which has the authority to make a study of Louisville
neighborhoods and structures to determine which are of signifi-
cant historic, cultural, aesthetic, architectural, or archaeologi-
cal interest.54 After a public hearing the Commission can desig-
United States citizens was considered to be a public use in this case.
41 278 U.S. 191 (1929). See also Flaccomio v. Mayor of Baltimore, 71 A.2d 12 (Md.
1950) in which the condemnation of property by the City of Baltimore for the Star
Spangled Banner Flag House was upheld as a public use. Even though the site was
operated by a private group, the city held title to the property.
Coke v. Commonwealth, 502 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1973).
5, LouisvILLE, Ky., ORDINANCE 58, Series 1973 (1973). "An Ordinance Establishing
an Historic Landmarks and Preservation Districts Commission and Relating to Guide-
lines and Procedures for Construction and Demolition within Such Districts." The
stated policy considerations of the ordinance are set out in section lb.
52 Id. § lc(1)-(7).
The eleven members of the Commission include eight people chosen by the
mayor, including at least one architect, one historian, one realtor, and one attorney;
the City's Director of Building and Housing Inspection; the Executive Director of the
Louisville and Jefferson County Planning Commission; and a member of the City
Board of Aldermen. Id. § 2a.
11 Id. § 3a(1).
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nate landmarks, landmark sites, and preservation districts.5
The designation of these sites is not arbitrary, but is based on
a number of criteria which can be applied to the sites in ques-
tion. " Once an area or building is so designated, the Commis-
sion appoints an Architectural Review Committee57 for the site
and files a copy of the designation with various city agencies.
5
1
Once a site is designated as a landmark, the ordinance limits
what may be done to it. One cannot "construct, reconstruct,
alter or demolish" 9 any structure without permission from the
Architectural Review Committed appointed for that site.60 Per-
sons affected must also keep the structures in good repair.'
Property owners who wish to make changes to their prop-
erty must first apply to the Committee for a "certificate of no
exterior effect." Permission to make any alterations will be
granted if the proposed change does not affect any "exterior
architectural feature" of the structure." If the permit is denied,
the property owner can then apply to the Committee for a
"certificate of appropriateness." The standard involved for the
approval of architectural changes is "whether the proposed
work would be appropriate for and consistent with the effectua-
tion of the purposes of this Ordinance. 6 3 The Committee has
30 days to recommend approval or disapproval to the Commis-
sion of the application or to serve notice of a public hearing. 4
The Commission then decides whether or not to approve the
request. If there was no hearing at the Committee stage, one is
held by the Commission.1
5
If the Commission denies the application, it has the power
to impose a 3-month waiting period during which it conducts
negotiations with the owner in order to find a way to preserve
Id. § 4a.
5' Id. § 4b(1) - (9).
' Id. § 4c.
SId. § 4d.
' d. § 6a.
"Id.
" Id. § 10.
" Id. § 7a.
Id. § 8a. See note 87 infra and accompanying text for a further explanation of
this standard.
" Id. § 8a, b.
"Id. § 8d.
1977]
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the property. If demolition or construction is involved, the
Commission can extend the period to 6 months.67 If no agree-
ment is reached during the waiting period, the Commission
issues a notice or right to proceed, 8 and the owner can make
the proposed changes to the property. Penalties are imposed for
violation of any provision of the ordinance.
IV. THE JEFFERSON CifcuIT COURT DECISION
Events leading up to the circuit court's decision in the
Louisville case are, briefly, as follows. 0 In 1974, the Woman's
Club of Louisville, which already owned a club house in the Old
Louisville Historic Preservation District, purchased two neigh-
boring lots. The Club wanted to demolish the 19th-century
Victorian structures located on the lots in order to create a
parking area. After negotiations regarding alternative parking
failed, the Club applied to the Commission for a certificate of
appropriateness. The certificate was denied after hearings by
the Architectural Review Committee. During the 6-month
waiting period, the Woman's Club met with city officials a
number of times, but the parties failed to reach an agreement.
By the terms of the ordinance, the Commission's authority
over the property expired March 4, 1975. In order to save the
houses, the City's Board of Aldermen filed a condemnation
resolution on the same day and obtained a temporary restrain-
ing order in Jefferson Circuit Court." When the Woman's Club
contested the restraining order, the court ruled that the His-
toric Preservation Ordinance was unconstitutional and dis-
" Id. § 8e.
6 Id. § 8e (2).
' Id. § 8f.
" Id. § 12. Penalties include a fine of $15 to $100 and/or imprisonment of up to
50 days for each offense. Each day of continued violation constitutes a separate offense.
,1 Information regarding the facts of this case came from the briefs submitted by
both parties as well as the Brief Amicus Curiae in City of Louisville v. Woman's Club,
No. 76-298 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 1976).
"1 The city filed under KRS §§ 416.410-.530 (1971). These sections were repealed
in 1976 and replaced by KRS §§ 416:540-.680 (1976). Section 416.550, as revised,
provides for any authorized person or entity to condemn private property for a public
purpose after the condemnor is unable to reach an agreement with the property owner.
All fact questions pertaining to the amount of compensation due the owner are triable
by jury, KRS § 416.620.
[Vol. 65
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solved the restraining order.12 The City appealed the decision
to the Kentucky Supreme Court and obtained a temporary
injunction preventing the Club from demolishing or altering
the houses pending the appeal. 3 The Supreme Court eventu-
ally reversed the lower court, held that the constitutionality
of the ordinance was not an appropriate issue for the condem-
nation hearing, and remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit
Court for consideration of the eminent domain issue.74
7 City of Louisville v. Woman's Club, No. 197724 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Jan. 17,
1976).
" Brief for Appellant, City of Louisville v. Woman's Club, No. 76-298 (Ky. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 17, 1976).
11 City of Louisville v. Woman's Club, No. 76-298 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 1976).
The Kentucky Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether the Jefferson
Circuit Court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Louisville ordi-
nance and decided that the lower court did not. The case was brought to the circuit
court by the Ciiy of Louisville as a condemnation proceeding under KRS § § 416.410-
.530 (1970) (see note 71 supra) after the Board of Aldermen voted to condemn the two
houses through their power of eminent domain. This proceeding by the City was
independent of the actions by the Historic Preservation Commission. The Woman's
Club argued that the condemnation proceeding was so closely tied to the Historic
Preservation Ordinance that the court did have jurisdiction over the question of the
constitutionality of the ordinance. Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 13-14. The City
argued that the question was moot since the authority of the Commission over the
controversy ended with the expiration of the 6-month period. Brief for Appellant, supra
note 73, at 9.
The question on remand to the circuit court is whether the city has authority to
use its powers of eminent domain to condemn these two houses. Governments have
traditionally had the power to condemn property for public use if they pay the owner
just compensation. What is included in the concept of "public use" has changed over
time, so that now governments do not have to maintain ownership of the property in
order to condemn it, so long as the public is benefited by the action. KRS § 58.010
(1971) defines public projects, and KRS § 83.420 (1976) provides that first-class cities
may "acquire property for municipal purposes by purchase or otherwise."
Thus, one option for the City of Louisville is to resell the condemned houses to
private persons who will restore and maintain the houses. The public purpose involved
here is the preservation of the historic neighborhood for the cultural and economic
benefit of the city. See notes 98-102 infra and accompanying text. In a manner similar
to urban renewal projects, the City does not have to retain title to the property in order
for the eminent domain proceeding to be valid. Rather it "may use, manage, improve,
sell and convey, rent or lease its property." KRS § 83.420 (Supp. 1976). Reply Brief
for Appellant at 4-5, City of Louisville v. Woman's Club, No. 76-2998 (Ky. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 17, 1976).
The Woman's Club argues that the condemnation by Louisville is not for a public
use but a private one. In support of its point, it cites a statement from a speech given
by Mayor Harvey Sloane to the Woman's Club on January 29, 1975: "I am confident
that if we are forced to take such an action, the homes can be resold to private groups
or persons who will agree to maintain and reuse them for the benefit of the neighbor-
1977]
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The circuit court's holding that the ordinance was uncon-
stitutional was based on three factors: The ordinance does not
provide any appeals provision; it is arbitrary; and the waiting
period results in a taking of the owner's property without com-
pensation. 5
A. The Lack of an Appeals Provision
The Jefferson Circuit Court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutional because it does not "grant any right of appeal
from what may be an arbitrary or capricious denial of the cer-
tificate."76 In Kentucky, the legislature can grant or alter ap-
peal rights77 unless a constitutional provision is involved. Thus,
unless a constitutional provision requires otherwise, it appears
that an administrative agency may be established without spe-
cifically providing for appeal.
78
If, however, a constitutional question is involved, there is
an inherent right of appeal from an administrative action.79 A
charge of arbitrary determinations on the part of the agency
would raise constitutional issues, since the Kentucky Constitu-
tion prohibits arbitrary governmental control over a person's
life, liberty, and property."0 Furthermore, the Kentucky Con-
stitution grants citizens access to the courts for any injury to
hood." Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 10.
The City's reply is that the possibility of a sale by the city to private parties is
speculative and that it would be on the condition that the buyer "maintain and reuse
them for the benefit of the neighborhood." Reply Brief for Appellant, supra at 5.
In the upcoming case, the Woman's Club has also raised the issues of whether the
creation of the historic district by the Commission, rather than the Board of Aldermen,
is legal and whether there is in fact a general plan under which the city is operating.
Telephone interviews with W. Scott Miller, Jr., counsel for Woman's Club, and Carson
Porter, counsel for City of Louisville,
The trial in the circuit court has been set for June 8, 1977.
75 City of Louisville v. Woman's Club, No. 197724 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Jan. 17,
1976).
76 Id.
n Ky. CONST. § 127; East Jefferson Improvement Ass'n v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 285 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Ky. 1955).
Is See State Racing Comm'n v. Latonia Agricultural Ass'n, 123 S.W. 681 (Ky.
1909). The courts "cannot review on appeal purely ministerial discretion. Nor can such
power be conferred on them by legislation." Id. at 688.
71 American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Ky. 1964).
0Ky. CONsT. art. 2.
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"lands, goods, person, or reputation. ' 81
According to Kentucky case law, judicial review is war-
ranted in situations where there is "action in excess of granted
powers, . . . lack of procedural due process, and . . . lack of
substantial evidentiary support.. ,"82 all of which are aspects
of "arbitrariness" on the part of the administrative agency. 3 It
follows, then, that even though an appeals provision has not
been written into the Louisville ordinance, it is not necessarily
unconstitutional,84 as review may still be obtained.
B. The Question of Arbitrariness
The court also held that the ordinance was invalid because
it allowed arbitrary actions on the part of the Committee. 5 The
question of arbitrariness revolves around the amount of discre-
tion the Committee has to designate structures or sites as land-
marks and to decide whether to grant permits for the alteration
or demolition of structures on the landmark list.
Attacks on an historic preservation commission's discre-
tion have centered on the delegation of authority from a legisla-
tive body to the commission and the accountability of the com-
mission to a higher authority. If a commission is given general-
ized authority to enact its own regulations, there is a possibility
of arbitrary decisions. However, if stringent regulations are
imposed on the commission, it would lack the necessary discre-
tion for fairness in specific cases.88
The Louisville ordinance lists four factors which the Com-
mittee must consider before it will grant a certificate of appro-
priateness. One major consideration is the effect of the pro-
" Ky. CONST. art. 14.
9" American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Ky. 1964).
A3 Id.
" The Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, notes that the lack of appeals provi-
sions has not been raised in other cases challenging such ordinances and lists several
ordinances which do not provide for judicial review yet which have been upheld.
0 See text accompanying note 76 supra for the pertinent quote from the opinion.
" State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
11 The four factors to be considered by the Committee are:
(1) The effect of the proposed work in creating, changing, destroying or
affecting the external architectural features of the improvements upon which
such work is to be done;
(2) The relationship between the results of such work and the external archi-
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posed work on the exterior architecture of the structure and on
the character of the preservation district where it is located.
These factors do not indicate a precise focal point for commit-
tee determination but do provide general guidelines.
Other historic preservation ordinances which include
equally general guidelines have been upheld on the ground that
they were adequate to prevent arbitrary decisions by giving the
commissions some workable standards. In City of Santa Fe v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc."s the court found Gamble-Skogmo in
violation of the city's historic zoning ordinance for failure to
comply with the requirement that window panes on structures
in the historic district be no more than 30 inches square. This
requirement was one of a number in the statute which referred
specifically to the "Old Santa Fe Style."89 Structures in the
Santa Fe historic district must conform to these statutory re-
quirements. The defendants challenged the ordinance estab-
lishing these requirements as being an arbitrary and unreason-
able use of police power, and as an attempt by the city to
impose aesthetic details on buildings. 0 The New Mexico Su-
preme Court rejected this argument, stating that the various
stylistic requirements were necessary to preserve the historic
"Old Santa Fe Style" and that the maintenance of the historic
zone was a valid use of police power for the general economic
and cultural welfare of the community.' The court further
found that since decisions of the style committee, which ap-
plied the provisions of the ordinance to proposed changes, were
subject to review by the city planning commission, and deci-
sions of the planning commission were subject to review by the
city council, the city had not delegated unrestricted or arbi-
tectural features of other improvements on such site or in such preservation
district;
(3) The effect of the proposed work upon the distinctive character or special
historic, aesthetic, architectural, archaeological or cultural interest or value
of the landmark, landmark site or preservation district; and
(4) The effects of such work upon the preservation, protection, perpetuation
and use of the landmark, landmark site or preservation district.
LouisviLLE, Ky., ORDINANCE 58, Series 1973, § 8a(1)-(4)(1973).
389 P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964).
Id. at 17.
"Id.
' Id. at 18.
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trary power to the style committee or the planning commis-
sion.1
2
Similarly, in New Orleans the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance93
established the Vieux Carr6 Commission, which issues permits
to property owners who wish to build, alter, or demolish struc-
tures in the Vieux Carr6 section of the city. In Maher v. City
of New Orleans4 the petitioner, who wanted to tear down a
cottage in the historic district, challenged the constitutionality
of the ordinance. The court of appeals upheld the statute
against an attack that it was arbitrary, even though there were
no official regulations directing the Commission's decisions. 5
Earlier cases in New Orleans also upheld the Vieux Carre
Ordinance against charges of vagueness as it applied to the
regulation of the size and character of signs."
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has also determined
that proposed acts establishing historic districts in the town of
Nantucket and in the Beacon Hill section of Boston were not
unconstitutional because of vagueness. The ordinances in
these cases were not arbitrary even though the historic commis-
sions involved had discretionary powers with respect to the
impact of the regulations on the modification or destruction of
historic structures.
The Louisville ordinance does not provide for city council
review of Committee decisions and as such can be distin-
guished from the Santa Fe and New Orleans ordinances. Nev-
,1 Id. at 18-19.
14 NEw ORLEANs, LA., CODE ch. 65 (Ordinance No. 14,538).
" 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 1062-63. Reasons given by the court to support its holding that the power
of the Commission was not arbitrary include the specifically limited territory over
which the Commission had authority, the composition and selection of members of the
Commission who have experience in the subject matter, the review procedure by which
the City Council can check Commission decisions, and the documented information
relating to the architecture and history of the Vieux Carr6 section of New Orleans.
" City of New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So. 2d 798 (La. 1953); City of New Orleans v.
Pergament, 5 So. 2d 129 (La. 1941). See Forman, supra note 29.
,1 Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1955); Opinion of
the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass. 1955). Other cases in which statutes
were upheld as not being arbitrary include: Bohannon v. City of San Diego, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 333 (Ct. App., 1973); M & N Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 250 N.E.2d
289 (Ill. App. 1969); Rebman v. City of Springfield, 250 N.E.2d 282 (Ill. App. 1969);
Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 316 A.2d 807 (Md. 1974); and Town of
Deering ex rel. Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 202 A.2d 232 (N.H. 1964).
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ertheless, there are provisions in the statute which prevent the
Architectural Review Committee from exercising unlimited or
arbitrary power. Individuals who have interests and expertise
in the field are chosen as members.18 There must be a public
hearing for each application for a certificate of appropriateness.
Most importantly, if the Committee and the Commission reject
the application, there is a 3- or 6-month period of negotiation,
after which the Commission no longer has authority to prevent
alteration. Further, the property owner has an inherent right
of appeal if a constitutional question is involved."9
C. The Issue of Confiscation or "Taking"
The Jefferson Circuit Court held that the ordinance consti-
tuted a taking because: "During the 3- or 6-month period in-
voked by the commission, the property owner remains in a
state of suspended animation, unable to sell, alter, or remodel,
and in some extreme situations, even to occupy his property,
yet his taxes march ever onward."'00
Historic preservation ordinances, like other zoning ordi-
nances, affect the use of property. In order to be valid, zoning
laws must not place such a heavy burden on the use of property
as to amount to confiscation or a taking of the property. Zoning
ordinances, unlike eminent domain statutes, do not require
compensation for the property owner for the restrictions.'10 The
Is LouisvnLE, Ky., ORDINANCE 58, Series 1973, § 4c. At least two of the five mem-
bers of an Architectural Review Committee serving a preservation district are owner-
residents of property in the district, and another member must be the City's Chief
Building Inspector.
Not all ordinances providing for review by interested parties are constitutional,
since there must be some workable standard. In Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust
Co. v. Roberge, a zoning ordinance which required the approval of two-thirds of the
neighbors for construction of a philanthropic home was held to be unconstitutional
since the neighboring owners had unchecked discretion in that they were not subject
to any standards or review. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
,1 See notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of this inherent
right of appeal.
11 City of Louisville v. Woman's Club No. 197724 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Jan. 17,
1976).
WI1 Eminent domain also differs from zoning ordinances in that the government
acquires title in the property; it purchases the property from the landowners, paying
just compensation for a public use. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. See notes 47-50 and
74 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the issues involved in an eminent
domain procedure.
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test of a zoning ordinance's validity is not one involving dimi-
nution of the property's value; rather, the test is that as long
as there is some economic benefit accruing to the property, the
regulation is not a taking. The property need not be applied to
its best use but only to a legal use. "If [an] ordinance is
otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police power, the fact
that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not
render it less constitutional. '1 2
An otherwise constitutional ordinance may be unconstitu-
tional in its application. Due process requires not only that the
general zoning ordinance have a reasonable relation to the gen-
eral welfare, but also that its application to a particular piece
of property be related to the general purpose of the ordinance
and that its effect not be confiscatory. 0 3 Due process also pro-
hibits the ordinance from depriving the owner of reasonable use
of the property and guarantees the owner notice of an historic
preservation commission's deliberations and an opportunity to
be heard. Generally, the historic preservation ordinances, in-
cluding that of Louisville, provide for such hearings before a
stated administrative board.0 4
In Maher v. City of New Orleans, the court held that there
was no taking since Maher could not show that the value of his
property had decreased to nothing. In particular, "Maher did
not show that the sale of the property was impracticable, that
commercial rental could not provide a reasonable rate of re-
"02 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962). See Maher v. City
of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) in which the Court stated: "The general rule at least
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking."
There are several tests for what constitutes a taking. These include the Mahon
"diminution-in-value" test; the "physical invasion" test; the Goldblatt "noxious use"
test; and the "arbitral-enterprise" test. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36 (1974); Note, supra note 13.
' U.S. CoNsT. amends V, XIV, § 1. See also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183 (1928); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass. 1955);
Opinion of the Justices of the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1955); Lutheran Church
in America v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
" LouISVILLE, Ky., OaDINAcE 58, Series 1973, § 8 b, c, d. See Mayor of Annapolis
v. Ann Arundel County, 316 A.2d 807 (Md. 1974). See also First Presbyterian Church
v. City Council of York, 360 A.2d 257 (Pa. Comm. 1976); NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-12.0 (1976).
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turn, or that other potential use of the property was fore-
closed.'05
In San Diego, an ordinance establishing and protecting the
"Old San Diego Planning District" regulated the construction
and remodeling of buildings in that neighborhood to preserve
the appearance of the pre-1871 area. ' The ordinance was up-
held by the California Court of Appeals, which held that the
requirements imposed on buildings and signs in the area did
not reduce their value to the extent of being a taking.' 7
The New York City Landmarks Preservation Law,'0 which
has been challenged on several occasions, has likewise been
upheld. This law establishes the Landmarks Preservation
Commission which has the power to designate historic land-
marks and historic districts after holding public hearings.' 9 If
the owner of a designated site wishes to make any alterations,
demolition, or construction on the site, he must apply to the
Commission for permission." ' The applicant may apply for a
certificate of no exterior effect"' or a certificate of appropriate-
ness.12 If the Commission denies the former, the applicant can
request the latter type of certificate;" 3 the Commission holds
a public hearing before it determines the latter."4 If the owner
can show economic hardship as defined by the ordinance, he
is provided with several methods of relief."1
5
' 516 F.2d 1051, 1066 (5th Cir. 1975).
208 Bohannon v. City of San Diego, 106 Cal. Rptr. 333 (Ct. App. 1973).
lot Id.
I" NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 8-A (1976).
109 Id. § 207-2.0. See Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d
305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974) and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 377
N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div. 1975).
o NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-4.0.
Id. § 207-5.0. One applies for a certificate of no exterior effect if the planned
alteration will not change the exterior architectural features of a structure or if the new
construction will be in harmony with existing structures.
,,2 Id. § 207-6.0. One applies for a certificate of appropriateness if there will be
some effect on the exterior of the structure. General standards which the Commission
considers are set out in this provision.
See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div.
1975).
"I NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 8-A, § 20-7-5.0a(3) (1976).
124 Id. § 207-7.0.
Its Id. § 207-8.0. Relief includes tax exemptions, assistance in obtaining a pur-
chaser, or condemnation. See Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 316
N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
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The New York Law was challenged in Trustees of Sailors'
Snug Harbor v. Platt, "I in which trustees of a home for retired
sailors wanted to demolish some 19th-century Greek revival
structures. The court formulated a test, similar to the one used
for commercial property,11 7 by which the Preservation Law
could be applied to charitable property. Charitable owners can
obtain relief "where maintenance of the landmark either physi-
cally or financially prevents or seriously interferes with carry-
ing out the charitable purpose."'1 8
In 1974, the New York Preservation Law was again chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds. The plaintiff in Lutheran
Church in America v. City of New York wanted to demolish a
residential structure once owned by J. P. Morgan, Jr."' The
church had been using the building as office space for the last
20 years but currently found it to be inadequate for this pur-
pose. Because the church was a charitable institution, the
Sailors' Snug Harbor test was applicable. The question of
whether the law was confiscatory as applied was answered in
the affirmative.
2
1
The most recent challenge to the New York City Law was
by the Penn Central Transportation Co., 121 which wanted to
make significant changes to the exterior of Grand Central Ter-
minal. 122 The court held that the Commission's denial of a cer-
tificate was not a taking. Since the building is not used for a
charitable purpose, the applicable test was whether Penn Cen-
tral could "[demonstrate] that the regulation in issue deprives
them of all reasonable beneficial use of their property.' ' 23 Even
though Penn Central may have been losing money at the sta-
tion, they could not show that they were "incapable of obtain-
"' 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 1968).
,"7 Id. at 316. The test for relief to owners of commercial property is that "the
continuance of the landmark prevents the owner from obtaining an adequate return."
" Id.
"I Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359
N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974). See also Note, Urban Landmarks: Preserving our Cities'Aesthetic
and Cultural Resources, 39 ALBANY L. Rav. 521 (1975) and Note, Environmental Con-
trol-Land Use-Historical Preservation, 1975 Wis. L. RFv. 260 (1975).
" 316 N.E.2d 305, 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 16 (1974).
2, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div. 1975).
' Id. at 26. The architect's plans also called for a fifty-story tower over the
Terminal.
IN Id. at 28.
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ing a reasonable return from Grand Central Terminal opera-
tions .... "124
In Annapolis, Maryland, the denial of a permit to the
county for demolition of a 19th-century church was held not to
be a taking since there was no confiscation of the property. The
court held the county was not "deprived of all reasonable use
of the site . . . [which is] the requirement for a finding of
confiscation by traditional zoning laws . . . [I]ts use was
not disturbed at all.
12 5
In First Presbyterian Church v. City Council of York, 2 1 the
church applied for a permit to demolish York House, a 19th-
century structure in the city's historic district. The permit was
denied after a hearing by the Board of Historical and Architec-
tural Review, and the church appealed. The court distin-
guished the tests of Sailors' Snug Harbor, which applied to
individual property designated as landmarks,'12 and Maher,
which applied to historic districts.' 5 So, although the church
is a charitable organization, the court applied the Maher test,
stating that the denial did not "preclude the use of York House
for any purpose for which it was reasonably adapted"'' 9 and
that the church had not made any attempts to sell, rent, or
otherwise utilize the structure.'3
Turning to the Louisville case, if one applies the Maher
test as interpreted by the York court,'31 the Woman's Club
would have to show that the effect of the ordinance was to
diminish the property value to nothing and that the ordinance
precluded any reasonable use of the property. It can be argued
that the club has not shown this. It purchased the houses in
1974 for $125,000; in 1975, when the city began eminent domain
proceedings, appraisers set the value of the houses at
124 Id.
"2 Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 316 A.2d 807, 822 (Md. 1974).
,,2 360 A.2d 257 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1976).
'" See notes 116-118 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of this
decision.
' See note 105 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of this decision.
"9 First Presbyterian Church v. City Council of York, 360 A.2d 257, 261 (Pa.
Comm. Ct. 1976). As in the Woman's Club of Louisville case, the church in York
wanted to build a parking lot where the building was located.
130 Id.
"I The Maher test is used because the two houses in question are located in the
Old Louisville Historic District.
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$140,000. '31 There are probably sources of federal funds to re-
store the houses since they are on the National Register.
1 3
Further, the club has not attempted to derive an income from
the houses but has boarded them up and evicted the tenants.
13 4
The Jefferson Circuit Court held that the 3- or 6-month
negotiation period which follows denial of the application by
the Commission constitutes a taking. This provision in the
Louisville ordinance is much less stringent than those in other
laws. In Louisville, the Commission has no authority over the
property after 6 months. if the parties cannot reach an agree-
ment, while other ordinances provide for permanent restric-
tions of the use of property1 31 or for restrictions on when a party
may reapply for a permit.136 The restriction in Louisville con-
cerns the alteration or demolition of property for only a limited
period. Further, the ordinance does not restrict the owner from
occupying, renting, or selling the property. Even if the test of
Sailors' Snug Harbor is applied to the Woman's Club as a
charitable organization, it is doubtful that the maintenance of
the houses "seriously interferes" with the club's charitable pur-
poses.'37
CONCLUSION
The preservation of the two houses in Louisville is not
simply a matter of saving two structures from the wrecking
ball; it involves the preservation of an entire historic district.
"I Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 5. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at
20.
3 Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 20-21. Funds are available from HUD
or the National Trust. The Old Louisville Residential District is listed on the National
Register of Historic Places, 41 Fed. Reg. 5951 (1976). The Amicus Brief also stated that
the Woman's Club may not be able to build its proposed parking lot due to the present
zoning law.
"' Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 20.
"u Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1066 (5th Cir. 1975).
,3 Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 316 A.2d 807 (Md. 1974). The
Annapolis ordinance is similar to that of Louisville in that it provides a 90-day negotia-
tion period. But if the application is rejected, the property owner must wait 1 year
before reapplying. Id. at 818.
I" Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 22 notes that alternative parking
proposals were offered to the Woman's Club and were rejected as non-permanent.
Although it is not known how Sailors' Snug Harbor fared in later court proceedings, a
fall 1976 CBS television news report mentioned that the home has moved from its New
York location to a rural site in the South.
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Even if the houses are not themselves of particular historical
significance, the fact that they are an inherent part of the Old
Louisville Historic District is important. Destruction of these
two houses will affect the cohesiveness of the entire
neighborhood'38 which had been recognized as an important
historic area.
The issue of the constitutionality of Louisville's historic
preservation ordinance will not be raised again with respect to
these two houses, but the question of the City's power of emi-
nent domain is still pending. It is hoped that if the constitu-
tional issue is raised in the future, the courts will uphold the
preservation statute for the protection of Louisville's and Ken-
tucky's heritage.' 9
Dale Deborah Brodkey
'' This same neighborhood approach was used in City of New Orleans v. Perga-
ment, 5 So. 2d 129, 131 (La. 1941): "The purpose of the ordinance is not only to
preserve the old buildings themselves, but to preserve that antiquity of the whole
French and Spanish quarter, the tout ensemble, so to speak, by defending this relic
against iconoclasm or vandalism."
,"I I wish to thank the following attorneys for providing their briefs to the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court and information on current developments in this case: Thomas
Crumplar, former counsel for Amicus Curiae; W. Scott Miller, Jr., counsel for
Woman's Club of Louisville; and Carson Porter, counsel for City of Louisville.
Editor's Note. Since this comment was written, the City has deposited $140,000
into the court for the houses. A jury trial was scheduled for September 21, 1977, on
the issue of valuation. The court has decided, in an opinion to a motion, that there
was a valid public use. Telephone interviews with Carson Porter, attorney for City of
Louisville, June 27, 1977 and W. Scott Miller, Jr., attorney for Women's Club, June
22, 1977.
